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INTRODUCTION 
Established by a Labour government in April 2000 and wound up at the end of March 
2011 by a Conservative-led coalition, the UK Film Council (UKFC) was the key 
strategic body responsible for supporting the film industry and film culture in Britain 
for over a decade. Cultural agencies such as the UKFC may be conjured into life by 
governments of one colour and unceremoniously interred by those of another. Such 
decisions are of considerable interest to all those who wish to understand the nature 
and exercise of political power in the cultural field.  
 
The UKFC’s creation owed much to the personal commitment of Chris Smith, 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport in the ‘new’ Labour government that 
took office in May 1997.1 Another Culture Secretary - the Conservative Jeremy Hunt 
- was responsible for its peremptory demise, as a member of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat cabinet installed in May 2010.2 These individuals’ actions need to be set in 
the wider context of the history of British film policy and also the particular 
conjunctures in which they took their decisions. 
 
The present chapter is a fragment of a wider study that addresses the UKFC’s 
performance in the round, ranging from the quest to develop a ‘sustainable’ film 
industry to facing the challenge of digital distribution (Doyle et al. 2015). 3  By 
focusing here on two key moments – the creation and destruction of a public agency - 
I intend to explore a largely unexamined aspect of cultural policy-making. In doing 
so, I wish to underline the role of elites and the uses of favoured forms of expertise in 
film policy-making, which exemplifies an approach to creative industries policy-
making I have developed elsewhere (Schlesinger 2009). The UKFC’s creation was 
decided on and implemented by a coterie around Chris Smith. Its closure ignored 
standard governmental processes. 
 
My account exposes discontinuous, irrational and asymmetrical features of the policy 
process. Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (2013: 6) in an overview of ‘blunders’ in 
British government, describe these as ‘occasions on which ministers and officials 
failed to achieve their declared objectives’. As we shall see, Labour did not achieve its 
goal of rationalizing the film agencies and the Coalition’s cut had little to do with the 
official account given. We might count the closure of the UKFC as a minor 
governmental blunder, contributed to – in no small measure – by a lack of clarity in 
its original construction.  
 
A NEAT HISTORY? 
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The UKFC’s decade-long lifespan makes it an ideal case for policy analysis, although 
there is both a pre-history and an aftermath to be taken into account. British 
governments have devised one or other form of state aid for film production since the 
early twentieth century in line with two persistent governing assumptions: first, an 
emphasis on promoting national identity through cultural expression and second a 
need to keep inventing new forms of economic intervention to keep the film industry 
alive (Magor and Schlesinger 2009).  
 
In the formative decade prior to the UKFC’s creation, tax incentives for film 
production returned to the policy agenda. In 1992, under Conservative Prime Minister 
John Major, key moves took place. Fiscal support for the film industry was 
reintroduced and the Department of National Heritage (DNH) was established. The 
DNH began to administer the UK’s new National Lottery in 1992. Arts Council 
England allocated £96m of Lottery funding to support three ‘film franchises’, in effect 
mini-studios set up in May 1997, as well as supporting individual projects. The 
incoming Labour government therefore inherited a Conservative policy initiative in 
the shape of Lottery support for film (Caterer 2011). Dissatisfied with how this was 
working, Labour decided to pursue institutional change. 
 
CREATING THE UKFC 
It rebadged the DNH as the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). In May 
1997, Culture Secretary Chris Smith set up the Film Policy Review Group (FPRG). 
This was co-chaired by Film Minister Tom Clarke, and – significantly – by Stewart 
Till, President of International, PolyGram Filmed Entertainment, whose appointment 
reflected the special status that global trade and distributor interests were given in the 
review (Magor and Schlesinger 2009: 306). 
 
The creation of the FPRG was a crucial step in establishing the Film Council. 
Published in March 1998, its report A Bigger Picture set the scene for future change: 
 
In the longer term, the Government will review the machinery for providing 
Government support to film in light of the recommendations of the British 
Screen Advisory Council 4  and other bodies. Its aim will be to establish 
structures which: 
 
- provide strategic leadership for the film industry and a clearer focus on its 
development; 
 
- achieve greater coherence by ensuring that the allocation of resources reflects 
priorities and that gaps and areas of overlap in provision are eliminated; 
 
- ensure that discretionary funding decisions are not all taken by one person or 
group of people. 
 
It will look at how the roles of all the national and regional publicly funded bodies fit 
together and will consider whether any changes are needed in order to maximize the 
benefits for the UK as a whole. (DCMS 1998: 50) 
 
The Film Council was launched on 2 May 2000 as a non-departmental public body, 
working at ‘arm’s length’ from government, with the status of a company limited by 
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guarantee. It absorbed other public and semipublic bodies concerned with film, 
including the Lottery Film Department of the Arts Council, British Screen Finance, 
the British Film Commission, and the production and regional funding roles of the 
British Film Institute (BFI). All remaining activities in the BFI came under the Film 
Council’s control. Although the BFI retained its formal autonomy, it now received 
funding through the Film Council, which also appointed the chair of its board. 
According to one well-placed source, interviewed in 2013, who wished to remain off 
the record, Chris Smith had wanted from the start to fold the BFI into the new body 
but was persuaded not to by some of its highly influential defenders. The 
rationalization, therefore, was incomplete as devolution of political powers to the 
UK’s ‘nations’ meant that, along with the BFI, separate screen support agencies 
existed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
 
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAD COME 
The idea of a unitary film body had been discussed in Labour Party circles in the 
1970s. A committee chaired by John Terry, managing director of the National Film 
Finance Corporation – appointed by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson - 
recommended the creation of a British Film Authority in 1976. But despite further 
work pursued under his successor James Callaghan, the opportunity to reshape the 
support landscape disappeared when Labour lost the 1979 general election. The 
Labour-supporting Director of the BFI, Wilf Stevenson,5 revived the idea again in 
1996, shortly before the FPRG’s report. Richard Attenborough, then Chairman of the 
BFI, prepared the ground for the meeting on the future of the film convened on 15 
June 1990 by Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (Puttnam 2010). 
Stevenson now thought that government needed to devolve decision-making by 
creating a body like France’s Centre national du cinéma (CNC). In his view, there 
were too many film bodies and more coherence was needed to represent the industry. 
Stevenson thought the unitary body’s time had finally come, that civil servants in the 
DNH shared his frustrations, and that the ground was being prepared for a policy shift 
(Interview 2013).  
 
Our research has uncovered other behind-the-scenes initiatives. One involved John 
Woodward who, after being appointed Director of the BFI in February 1998, became 
the Film Council’s first CEO in October 1999. He had moved there from the BFI to 
join the new Chairman, the leading film director, Alan Parker, who had been 
Chairman of the BFI’s Board. These new appointments came at the initiative of 
Culture Secretary Chris Smith. Prior to running the BFI, Woodward was already a key 
player as CEO of the Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television, PACT, when he 
had a ‘conversation with Chris Smith…about all these different bodies…and [Smith] 
said, “Well, wouldn’t it make more sense to pool all the stuff together? … Could you 
write me a paper about how you might rationalize it all?” Which I did.’ (Interview 
2013). 
 
Woodward commissioned a consultancy report (Hydra Associates 1997) that he said 
‘was a model for one overarching film organization for the industry’ but which would 
exclude the BFI as ‘the cultural institution’ (Interview 2013). Woodward had been 
‘amused’ to find the idea resurfacing in the FPRG’s report. His account provides an 
insight into how decisions seemingly taken as a result of recommendations after a due 
process of inquiry may be pre-decided: 
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When this [A Bigger Picture] was published, there was a page at the back which 
basically, literally in the small print, that said, by the way, we are going to 
rationalize [the] machinery – which was never discussed at any point in the Film 
Policy Review by anyone. And that was a decision that had clearly been made 
privately. (Interview 2013) 
 
Woodward believed that the rationalization of existing structures was Smith’s pitch to 
the Treasury to show that there would be ‘efficiency savings’ in government 
(Interview 2013). His account suggests that Smith had – or was advised to – 
rationalize. He then asked Woodward to figure out how to do it, used the idea 
informally as a justification for change, and with the proposal now firmly lodged in 
his private circle, had something to drop into the FPRG’s recommendations via his 
appointees. Setting up the FPRG, therefore, did not so much instigate a process of 
discovery but rather endorsed a policy position already privately established. 
However, this certainly is not Smith’s own retrospective account: 
 
We didn’t come into government with the idea of creating a Film Council – it 
emerged out of the work of the Bigger Picture group, my response to the rather 
chaotic landscape of support for film, and the need to bring some coherence to 
it. (Interview 2013) 
 
Smith’s emphasis is on his pursuit of a rational process to arrive at a conclusion. This 
was the official view taken by the DCMS, where civil servants were tasked with 
following up the Film Policy Review Group’s recommendation to create a new 
leading body – which became the Film Council. 6   Inside government, it was 
maintained that the drive towards creating such a new institution offering strategic 
leadership had been the outcome of discussion and debate, and had emerged as a 
result of this process.  
 
It was evident, nonetheless, that a strong lead had come from Smith’s special advisor 
in the DCMS, John Newbigin, as well as from Neil Watson, a very close associate of 
the prominent film producer, David Puttnam, who (as a life peer) later occupied a 
multifaceted policy-related role in the ‘new’ Labour project.7  
  
John Newbigin said that what came out of A Bigger Picture was the idea of ‘one big 
organization’, that Chris Smith knew what he was looking for and the Film Policy 
Review Group was set up with that in mind (Interview 2013). Prior to this, there had 
been ‘high-level involvement’ in the rethinking of structures by key film industry 
figures such as David Puttnam and also Richard Attenborough, then Chairman of the 
BFI Board of Governors, which underlines the importance of private conversations 
outside the formal review process. We may conclude, therefore, that the direction of 
travel was set well before the FPRG’s deliberations occurred. 
 
 
THE LOGIC OF RATIONALIZATION  
Reflecting on the UKFC’s origins, just as Jeremy Hunt, his eventual Conservative 
successor was dismantling that body, Chris Smith remarked: 
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I felt there was a need for two things. One was much greater coherence – hence 
the idea of bringing everything together under one roof. Second, I wanted to 
make sure that we brought what one might call the artistic side of British film-
making together with the more commercial side so that each could usefully feed 
off the other. (Macnab 2010: 3) 
 
This encapsulates the logic of rationalization. It is based on the belief that one agency 
is better than many because it may concentrate resources and pursue more effective 
strategic action. This logic also involves a process of disavowal and taking distance 
from superseded bodies judged to be ineffective.  
 
The pursuit of ‘coherence’ meant that the existing patchwork funding arrangement 
was found wanting. But the goal of creating a single agency was not achieved 
because, as noted, the creation of the Film Council – while sweeping up some smaller 
bodies – left the BFI reduced and weakened, with much of the cultural remit of film 
policy sub-contracted by the Film Council to the older body. This affected the 
achievement of Smith’s second goal: that of making the industrial and the cultural 
wings of the film sector interact. This proved difficult, Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
(2012a: 300, 298) has suggested, because New Labour strategy ‘really was about the 
creative industries’, putting ‘film culture firmly in second place’, removing 
‘production from the BFI’s brief’ and leading to ‘the subordination of the BFI to a 
new organisation of a totally different type’.   
 
Woodward, who became director of the BFI in February 1998, recalled that he and 
Alan Parker had met Chris Smith at the DCMS some six or seven months later. It was 
made clear at this meeting that a new organization would ‘have oversight of all the 
film funding. … At which point, the BFI would not be getting its money direct from 
government. … It was a fundamental shift in the power relationship’ (Interview 2013) 
and this was hard for the BFI to accept. In fact, the creation of the Film Council was a 
tremendous blow to the BFI, which both lost its chairman, Alan Parker, and its 
director, John Woodward, to the new body. During the ‘shadow’ period from October 
1999 to April 2000, when the Film Council was finally established, the BFI’s top 
leadership was very ill prepared for the coming change in status, according to one key 
insider (Interview 2013),  
 
 
THE LOGIC OF EXPERTISE 
A second logic also informed the new arrangements. The role of expertise in 
government was central to the Labour project, not least as so many of its leading 
lights either came from or relied heavily on think-tanks or policy advising. The 
creation of the Film Council was of a piece with the Labour’s drive to develop the 
creative industries, with think tanks and input by leading industry figures mobilized to 
that end (Schlesinger 2007; 2009). 
 
Applying the logic of expertise entailed first, finding fault with (and disavowing) the 
know-how and practice of existing agencies. Second, it set a value on specific kinds 
of expertise as especially credible and effective, thus legitimizing them. The next task 
was to find the right exemplars of embodied knowledge by choosing particular 
individuals to undertake the necessary task of transformation. 
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Mid-way through the UK Film Council’s life, Margaret Dickinson and Sylvia Harvey 
(2005: 425) criticized the closed process whereby the UKFC was established and 
noted the ‘relatively limited range of interests represented on its governing body’. 
This stricture is borne out by our research. 
 
Smith has described how he set about creating the framework for change: 
 
 [When] I became Secretary of State – one of the very first engagements I had 
was to go to the Cannes Film Festival [in May 1997] and I hosted a reception 
for the British film industry and I met with a lot of the key players at that time.  
And, sort of, on the spur of the moment - it wasn’t quite on the spur of the 
moment, but it was only, sort of, 2 or 3 days in the gestation - I decided to 
establish the Film Policy Review Group and to ask Stewart Till to chair it. And I 
announced that at the Film Festival. (Interview 2013) 
 
Stewart Till, who after his stint co-chairing the FPRG became deputy-chairman, and 
subsequently the second chairman of the Film Council, described his recruitment thus: 
 
It was…1997 and Chris Smith was the Secretary of State for the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport and he went to David Puttnam and said, ‘Look, I want 
to review the British film industry and I want to have the Film Minister, Tom 
Clarke, to co-chair with someone from the industry.’ And Puttnam put me 
forward. I had a thirty-second interview with Chris Smith on the beach in 
Cannes. And Chris said, would I chair it with Tom. (Interview 2008) 
 
Producer, amongst numerous other films, of Chariots of Fire (1981) and The Killing 
Fields (1984), and former CEO of Columbia Pictures (1986-88), David Puttnam’s 
advice was evidently crucial in identifying the required experts. Puttnam had a 
complex and contradictory relationship to Hollywood. He was marked by the 
immense influence of what – following Pierre Bourdieu (1984: 101) - I have labelled 
the ‘Hollywood entertainment habitus’. This was shared in distinct ways by several of 
the UKFC’s board members, and certainly by all three of its chairmen (Schlesinger 
2015). Till – with his PolyGram Filmed Entertainment role (until the company folded 
in 1999) – represented a European attempt to create a quasi studio system. His deputy 
chairmanship of the Film Council, along with the appointment of Alan Parker as 
chairman, gave a strong inflection to major production house and distributor values.  
 
Within the DCMS, civil servants worked with Chris Smith and his special adviser 
John Newbigin, who led much of the input from senior officials. A key move was to 
produce ‘really strong role specifications’ for the Film Council’s Chairman and CEO 
posts, so they could ‘go off and create the strategic vision, which was their first 
business plan’ (Interview, 2013).  
 
However, those seen as the men for the job - Alan Parker, the new Chairman, and 
John Woodward, the new CEO, were initially in the wrong place: doing precisely 
those jobs at the BFI. Inside government, those selected to join the board were seen as 
embodiments of the best available expertise and as complementing the skills 
possessed by the new Chairman and CEO. 
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Whereas in side the DCMS it was the careful pursuit of the appointments process that 
was invoked, thus legitimizing expertise in terms of explicit criteria, Stewart Till 
emphasized the role of personal connections: ‘I mean from the get-go, Chris Smith 
recruited, put together the first board almost, well, totally himself, taking some 
members of the Film Policy Review Group and just people he’d come across’ 
(Interview, 2008). 
 
INTIMATIONS OF MORTALITY 
We now shift from a tale of creation to one of destruction, preceded by an 
indeterminate interim phase. From early 2009, over a period of eighteen months, 
merger talks between the UKFC and the BFI were in train. The key question during 
that period, in the run-up to the general election of May 2010, was which body would 
survive. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (2012b) has given the best available bare bones 
account to date.8 John Woodward made the first key move, it appears, in May 2009, 
when – mindful of economic stringency ahead, whichever government might be 
elected in May 2010 – he commissioned a legal analysis from which two main options 
emerged:  
 
Either the BFI might be absorbed into the UKFC through the creation of a BFI 
Trust of which the UKFC would be sole trustee, or the UKFC could be folded 
into the BFI. The former model, which was the preferred one, would leave the 
UKFC in control; the BFI would retain its charitable status but probably have to 
lose its Royal Charter.9 (Nowell-Smith, 2012b: 307) 
 
This initiated a complex series of negotiations, with the DCMS apparently determined 
to effect a merger before the next general election, but – in part, through ministerial 
indecision - failing to bring this about. Both organizations’ boards and CEOs were 
involved in the merger talks, as well as ministers and civil servants at the DCMS. The 
dialogue was conducted in a wary and mutually mistrustful atmosphere. The UKFC’s 
chairman, Tim Bevan, later remarked that the talks were ‘not what would be called a 
smooth road’ (Bevan, 2011). Senior figures inside the BFI believed that its values 
were not respected by the UKFC. In the acerbic view of one insider, the BFI, which 
sought its own contrary legal advice to that of the UKFC, and which played both its 
charitable status and the Royal Charter as obstacles to take-over, had successfully 
deflected attack.  
 
The BFI kept putting up the Royal Charter and kept putting up Charity 
Commissioner’s blocks. … They say, ‘Oh, we are an independent charity’. 
Well, of course you are not, you’re totally dependent on government funding for 
your sustainability. …Your Royal Charter is governed by the Privy Council, 
which is, in effect, the Cabinet. …The BFI did, from time to time, put up these 
alleged roadblocks to structural reform. (Interview, 2013) 
 
The process reached an inconclusive stage, as Nowell-Smith (2012b: 308) recounts: 
 
an outline agreement was reached before the end of March [2010], leaving the 
BFI and its Charter formally intact but with crucial questions about the form the 
new organisation would take and it would pursue still very much up in the air. 
 
However, this still half-baked solution was soon overtaken by events. 
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DEATH OF THE UKFC 
The UKFC’s abolition followed the May 2010 general elections, which had resulted 
in the formation of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. The 
Conservative wing of the coalition came into power determined to axe at least some 
quangos strongly associated with Labour. In opposition, the new Conservative prime 
minister, David Cameron, had identified the communications regulator, Ofcom, as a 
target. After the general election that body experienced a deep cut and a rolling back 
of its policy role rather than annihilation.10 The BBC had also been fingered, with 
evidence of collusive attacks by the Murdoch media camp and the Tories. It too faced 
cuts and a redefined use of the licence fee.11 But well before those actions were taken, 
it was on the UKFC - never publicly in the frame for closure - that the ultimate blow 
fell. 
 
On 21 June, the new government announced that the merger talks were on hold. 
Because he had considered the two bodies to be incompatible, Ed Vaizey, the 
Conservative Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries, told 
John Woodward (Interview 2013) that he wanted the UKFC to concentrate on the film 
industry (perhaps becoming the core of a new creative industries council), with the 
BFI continuing to support film culture. Both Woodward and the UKFC’s chairman, 
film producer Tim Bevan, disagreed with this position. 
  
A month later, therefore, the decision to abolish the UKFC, announced in the House 
of Commons on 26 July 2010 by Jeremy Hunt, the Secretary of State for Media, 
Culture and Sport, came as a huge shock to the UKFC. As Woodward (Interview 
2013) put it: 
 
One Saturday morning, Tim [Bevan] got a … call from Ed Vaizey when he was 
in LA, I think, just saying, ‘I am terribly sorry, but we decided yesterday we 
have to abolish the Film Council and we are announcing it on Monday.’  
 
Why was the UKFC abolished? The official reason given to the House of Commons 
on 26 July 2010 by Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt was that: ‘abolishing the UK Film 
Council and establishing a direct and less bureaucratic relationship with the British 
Film Institute […] would support front-line services while ensuring greater value for 
money. Government and Lottery support for film will continue’ (Hunt 2010). 
 
But at that time, no decision had yet been taken as to which body would administer 
Lottery support and replace the UKFC as lead body for film. Still on the attack, in 
September 2010, Hunt subsequently told the House of Commons Media, Culture and 
Sport (CMS) Committee: 
The Film Council spent 24% of the grant that it received on its own 
administration and we asked ourselves if there was a better way to support the 
UK film industry than having a large number of executives paid more than 
£100,000 and an office in LA. (cited in CMS Committee 2011: par. 116)12 
 
Tim Bevan responded that the government had taken  
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a bad decision, imposed without any consultation or evaluation. People will 
rightly look back on today's announcement and say it was a big mistake, driven 
by short-term thinking and political expediency. British film, which is one of 
the UK's more successful growth industries, deserves better.13  
 
He also later disputed Hunt’s calculations in his own evidence to the CMS Committee 
in November 2010. Although Vaizey delivered the blow, Bevan (2011) told the 
Committee: ‘He was the bearer of the tidings. I don’t know whether he fired the bullet 
or not.’ Less equivocally, he told us: ‘I entirely blame Jeremy Hunt, actually, because 
he made the policy decision and then got somebody else to go and execute it’ 
(Interview 2013). Both he and Woodward were furious at the lack of planning behind 
the decision, which the latter publicly described as a ‘blitzkrieg’.14 
 
Beyond the official account of making efficiency savings, political ambition is the 
recurrent explanation given for the cut. According to John Newbigin, ‘Jeremy Hunt 
wanted to be best boy’ by demonstrating he could undertake cuts as part of the 
coalition’s austerity drive. This was also Woodward’s view and that of most 
informants. In off the record comments, moreover, some key players have said that 
there were divisions between Hunt and Vaizey over the decision and that the latter 
believed that the government had axed the wrong body. If so, Vaizey certainly held to 
the official line in later evidence to the CMS Committee. He observed: ‘I think the 
merger of the Film Council with the BFI is an achievement and a renewed policy for 
British film’ (Vaizey 2011). He acknowledged that the decision had come as a ‘bolt 
from the blue’ and said the Friday phone call to Tim Bevan had been intended to 
minimize leaks before the parliamentary announcement the following Monday. The 
CMS Committee found the decision ‘surprising’ and was ‘critical of the 
Government’s lack of dialogue’ with those affected. It did, however, endorse the 
eventual decision taken on 29 November 2010, namely that the BFI would become 
the ‘flagship body for film policy in the UK’ from 1 April 2011 (Vaizey 2010). 
 
On 7 March 2011, the Labour peer Wilf Stevenson raised questions about the closure 
process in the House of Lords, where he accused the government of ‘abolishing the 
UK Film Council by press release’.15 He explained his intervention as follows: 
 
The reason I went on about this is because w ewere talking about the proper 
processes that should exist for closing down a public body…We [Labour] could 
hardly argue against because we had asked the BFI and the Film Council to 
consider merging themselves. So we weren’t very far apart on it. (Interview 
2013) 
 
For its part, the National Audit Office drew attention to other procedural failings. It 
reported that the DCMS’s decision to close the UKFC ‘was not informed by a 
financial analysis of the costs and benefits of the decision…such as lease cancellation, 
redundancy and pension crystallization costs.’ Nor had the Department planned for 
the transfer of functions to the BFI on 1 April 2011 (NAO 2011: 7, 31).  
 
All of these criticisms underline King and Crewe’s (2013: 386-387) point that there is 
a ‘deficit of deliberation’ in British politics. They characterize a deliberative approach 
as involving careful consideration, not being over-hasty, and conferring and taking 
counsel. None of these criteria was met when the UKFC was axed. 
 10 
 
In fact, the key shifts following the UKFC’s closure involved yet another redrawing 
of the institutional map. Most of the UKFC’s functions (and 44 of its 73 posts) were 
transferred to the BFI on 1 April 2011. The Regional Screen Agencies were closed 
and replaced by a new body intended to work alongside the BFI, Creative England. 
Film London took over the role of attracting inward investment. In the end, the BFI 
was the principal beneficiary of the closure, although in ways that would come deeply 
to challenge its existing cultural norms. In a paper written after the abolition had been 
decided, the BFI welcomed the restoration of its direct reporting to the DCMS which 
would allow it ‘to have a conversation at a departmental level alongside other national 
cultural bodies and collections, giving a much needed direct voice for film as an art 
form’ (BFI, 2010: par.7.2). However, given its newly expanded remit, major 
adjustments – not least absorbing former UKFC staff and their ethos - would lie 
ahead. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
By focusing on a striking case, this brief account reveals much about how cultural 
policy is made in the UK. The UKFC’s creation was preceded by a considerable 
backroom preparatory phase involving a small ‘new’ Labour policy-forming nexus. 
The creation of the FPRG – handpicked on advice given to Chris Smith – provided 
the framework for endorsing a key policy already decided on, as opposed to actually 
discovering the need for a new agency through a deliberative process. The selection of 
the duo to head the new venture – Alan Parker and John Woodward - emerged from 
the same network of connections, based on a shared diagnosis of the ills of the UK 
film industry and what was needed to cure them. So did the appointment of the rest of 
the Film Council’s first board. 
 
Two logics legitimized the creation of the UKFC: rationalization and expertise. 
Rationalization involves a critique of the existing landscape coupled with a proposal 
to simplify its workings, whereas the expertise that matters is seen as possessed by 
those who agree with the new project. This picture is consistent with my earlier 
analysis of creative industries policy, which involved the preferred sourcing of ideas 
by a small number of key players with a broadly shared worldview (Schlesinger 
2009). 
 
‘New’ Labour’s innovation hardly came about in a transparent manner, appearances 
to the contrary. But by comparison, complete opacity prevailed when the Film 
Council was axed. Jeremy Hunt’s zealous desire to kill a quango was acted on so 
rapidly and ruthlessly that the UKFC’s decision-makers were taken totally by surprise 
and there was no wider consultation to assess the consequences. After a period of 
indecision following the closure announcement, Conservative ministers hit upon 
precisely the rationalization that they had earlier rejected: a merger that meant shifting 
surviving UKFC expertise into the BFI. The lack of due process – commented on both 
in Parliament and by the National Audit Office, not to speak of across the film 
industry –left an institutional succession problem for which urgent solutions had to be 
found.  
 
The creation of the UKFC was the outcome of strategic calculation by a coterie 
committed to a broader conception of creative industries policy. However, when 
under the successor government the axe unexpectedly fell, the implications of the 
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Film Council’s expedient demise had not been thought through at all. Will any lessons 
be learned? 
                                                         
NOTES 
1 Created Baron Smith of Finsbury in June 2005, he was Secretary of State from May 
1997-June 2001. 
2 He was Secretary of State from May 2010-September 2012.  
3 ‘The UK Film Council: A Study of Film Policy in Transition’ was funded by the UK 
Arts and Humanities Research Council, grant ref. no. AH/J000457X/1. The project 
team’s members were Gillian Doyle (PI), Philip Schlesinger and Raymond Boyle 
(CIs) and Lisa Kelly (Research Associate). Thanks to my colleagues for their 
comments and to Richard Paterson and his eye for the nuance. 
4 The British Screen Advisory Council is ‘an independent industry-funded body’ that 
represents ‘the audiovisual sector in the UK’ – in effect, a lobby 
(www.bsac.uk.com/about-us.html, accessed: 29 November 2013. It was set up under a 
Labour government in 1975. 
5 Created Baron Stevenson of Balmacara in 2010. 
6  One civil servant tasked with implementing the FPRG’s recommendations later 
joined the staff of the Film Council as Senior Executive Government Relations. 
7 Created Baron Puttnam of Queensgate in 1997. Neil Watson became a key strategy 
adviser to the UKFC and subsequently the BFI. 
8 For further detail about these negotiations see Doyle et al. (2015), Chapter 9. 
9 A royal charter is a formal document issued by the monarch, granting a right or 
power to an individual or a body corporate. The BFI’s royal charter was originally 
granted in 1983 and amended in 2000. 
10  http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/oct/21/ofcom-job-losses-spending-review 
accessed 3 January 2014. 
11 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-11572171. 
12 The costs of the UKFC were heavily disputed in evidence to the CMS Committee. 
There is no space to deal with this here. 
13 http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/jul/26/uk-film-council, accessed 3 January 
2014. 
14 http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/jul/26/john-woodward-film-council, accessed 
3 January 2014. 
15  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/110307-
0002.htm#11030728000052, Col. 1413T, accessed 3 January 2014. 
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